Peer-reviewed article · 2018
Temptation in Vote Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines
Allen Hicken, Stephen Leider, Nico Ravanilla, and Dean Yang · Journal of Development Economics 131: 1-14
In brief
Vote selling as a temptation good: in a Philippine field experiment, simply inviting voters to promise not to sell their votes measurably reduced vote selling.
Abstract
We test the predictions of a behavioral model of transactional electoral politics in the context of a randomized anti-vote-selling intervention in the Philippines. We model selling one's vote as a temptation good: it creates positive utility for the future self at the moment of voting, but not for past selves who anticipate the vote-sale. We also allow keeping or breaking promises regarding vote-selling to affect utility. Voters who are at least partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation can thus use promises not to vote-sell as a commitment device. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by a majority of respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in electoral races with smaller vote-buying payments. The more effective promise treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to make another type of promise, to accept vote-buying payments but to nonetheless “vote your conscience,” is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with voters being partially (but not fully) sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation.
Research annotationQuestion, variables, design, findings, and mechanism at a glance▾
- Research question
- Can voters use commitment devices to stop themselves from selling their votes?
- Independent variable (X)
- Randomized invitation to promise not to sell one's vote, compared against an invitation to accept payment but vote one's conscience and against control, with additional variation in the size of vote-buying payments across electoral races.
- Dependent variable (Y)
- Vote selling.
- Identification strategy
- Randomized anti-vote-selling intervention in the Philippines, interpreted through a behavioral model in which vote selling is a temptation good and promises serve as commitment devices.
- Main findings
- A majority of respondents took up the promise. It reduced vote selling, by 10.9 percentage points in the smallest-stakes election, with larger effects where vote-buying payments were smaller. The conscience promise was significantly less effective.
- Mechanism
- Voters are partially but not fully sophisticated about their own vote-selling temptation, so an advance promise binds a future self who would otherwise accept payment.
- Why it matters
- Recasts vote selling as a self-control problem rather than a pure price calculation, opening a cheap behavioral instrument for anti-vote-buying policy.
- Speaks to
- vote buying and clientelismbehavioral political economytemptation, self-control, and commitment devicesfield experiments in development
Cite
@article{hicken2018temptation,
title = {Temptation in Vote Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines},
author = {Allen Hicken and Stephen Leider and Nico Ravanilla and Dean Yang},
journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.012},
}